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Abstract 
 
The way in which women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have been 
portrayed in international development and rights discourse is based on a narrow, ahistorical 
view of Arab/Muslim majority societies, which exhibits an overconfidence in the discipline of 
economics and the ideology of neoliberalism, or free-market economics. Based on arguments 
presented by anthropologists, feminist economists, geographers, sociologists, comparative 
literary scholars and others, I explore in this thesis the legacy of colonialism in MENA in its 
various incarnations: as physical colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries; as suppression of 
indigenous knowledge in favor of scientific, western knowledge; as speaking on behalf of 
women and making general assumptions about their behaviors, desires and motivations; as 
ignorance of the West’s contribution to social, economic and political problems; and as the 
power to restructure modern Arab economies in ways that hurt poor households and women in 
particular.  
 
I engage in an empirical analysis of a recent World Bank document focusing on the status of 
women in MENA societies and economies to determine which narratives dominate, and which 
viewpoints are omitted. Due to the complicated nature of everyday life in this region, I suggest 
that various qualitative studies, such as those presented throughout the thesis, are crucial to 
understanding what different women in the region want, if anything, from the international 
community. I also suggest that the mainstream development community curb its enthusiasm for 
free-market economics, as these ideologies have done more harm than good for women in 
MENA. Instead, the world should make an effort to listen to different viewpoints and 
acknowledge the complex history of western involvement that has contributed to the 
circumstances in which these women live. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Based on the prevalence of media and international human rights conversations that focus 
on the perceived oppression of women in Arab/Muslim majority societies, the international 
community seems to hold a special concern for this demographic. In the industry of international 
economic and social development, the focus is often on women’s low levels of participation in 
the workforce and lack of freedom in public places, blaming cultural and religious factors as if 
they grew inevitably out of the fabric of an isolated society. This thesis aims to shed light on how 
these viewpoints came about, and how they are being reinforced through the documents and 
policies of mainstream development institutions such as the World Bank and the UN. It also 
explores how the global hierarchy of knowledge about the region has favored western 
perspectives, including the dominance of free market economics and its influence on public 
policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, often to the detriment of the most 
marginal members of these societies. 
Through a gender analysis of development issues and discourse inspired largely by 
anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod, who challenged her readers to rethink assumptions about the 
condition of Arab/Muslim women, I argue that reductionist views of this demographic came 
from Europeans in the colonial MENA region, and have more recently been masked by the 
technical, professional solutions proposed in development. Much of my examination of 
colonialism comes from scholars’ analyses of the literature and political communications of that 
era, as well as Abu-Lughod’s critique of a 21st century UN report on the state of Arab women. 
Based on Abu-Lughod’s critique, I perform empirical research using my own observations about 
language used in a World Bank report on Arab women and the UN’s Human Development Index 
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materials. To counter some of the free market arguments that much of the authoritative western 
viewpoints represent, I lastly draw from feminist critiques of national economic data 
measurements, and economics as a discipline in general. To demonstrate the damage done in the 
name of economistic ideologies, I refer to anthropological accounts of women’s survival tactics 
in MENA. 
Because no person or society exists in modern day without historical context or global 
links, the overarching theme in my thesis is the legacy of colonialism in MENA in its various 
forms. These take shape as: physical colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries; suppression of 
indigenous knowledge in favor of scientific, western knowledge; speaking on behalf of women 
and making general assumptions about their behaviors, desires and motivations; ignorance of the 
West’s contribution to social, economic and political problems; and the power to restructure 
modern Arab economies in ways that hurt poor households and women in particular. This 
critical, historical and reflective approach is essential to untangling the complex web of political, 
economic, and social factors creating the negative conditions that the West is intent on fixing, 
while questioning whether or not these repair efforts are warranted in the first place.  
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Preface 
 
Why does the white girl want to study Arab women? 
 
I am a middle-class, agnostic American female of mixed European ancestry who has never 
experienced blatant oppression, physical danger or significant prejudice. Given my background, 
it may seem odd or unjustified that I focus my research on a demographic I will never intimately 
understand; a group that has been subject to such scrutiny in the eyes of the media and Western 
politics, and which has been a target of the concerted international political-economic 
interventions (and occasional derogation) that I explore in this thesis. So, why do I not focus on 
my own demographic or that of my ancestors? There are a few reasons.  
 
I was originally drawn to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to a random 
decision to study the Arabic language, with which I subsequently became enamored. The 
language was my intellectual conduit into MENA, and both an affinity for social issues and a 
female identity steered me towards an interest in the women who live there. Ever the contrarian, 
I am also intrigued by nearly any topic that could be described as widely misunderstood. From 
my studies and my (limited) time spent in an Arab country, I think it is not hyperbolic to state 
that these women are indeed misunderstood. 
 
For nearly as long as I have been engaged in international studies, I have been dissatisfied by 
knowledge that originates from a position of global superiority, prosperity, safety and intellectual 
hubris. The overarching ideas that have inspired this journey are things that I believe most North 
Americans and Europeans take for granted. Firstly, I consider the concept of modernity: the 
West’s hero-worshipping of science and technology, of natural landscapes transformed and 
utilized in the pursuit of capital, profit, and a hastened future. Secondly, as this “progress” would 
not have been possible were it not for uneven capital accumulation resulting from the domination 
of other societies, I will explore colonialism in MENA and its lasting impact on the social and 
economic makeup of communities and states. Other concepts that underscore life in the modern 
West, such as individuality, are situated in our specific cultural heritage as Europeans (or 
descendants thereof), and also should not be assumed as universal. 
 
The processes leading up to this final product have truly transformed my worldview, creating a 
sense of discomfort that I cannot shed, and thus must explore. To get there, I drew from the 
influential works of Middle Eastern and feminist scholars – many of them quite critical – to gain 
as much insight as possible into the lives of the Arab women who have been fetishized to the 
extent that a piece of cloth has become an object of terror. Through this investigation, I hope to 
contribute in any way possible to a more balanced picture of a marginalized group. As I aim to 
show, these women are as complex and diverse as any other group, yet in an international lens 
have been unfairly reduced to an oppressed, faceless mass of humans incapable of improving 
their own circumstances. I am not stating that western perspectives are altogether illegitimate, 
but rather that they need to be understood for what they are: perspectives, not one-size-fits-all 
solutions for all of the world’s ills. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 “To become modern...is to act like the West” 
- Timothy Mitchell (2000, p. 1) 
Objectives 
Since the mid-20th century, there has been a prevailing notion among rich European and 
North American world powers (collectively “the West”) that their economic policies, 
technological fixes and funding are necessary to develop and modernize less industrialized 
countries (or “developing countries”). There is also a more recent international consensus that 
women’s participation must be a factor in this development. In a post-9/11 world, the West has 
increasingly had a particular interest in women in Arab countries, seeking to liberate them from 
their seemingly oppressive, secluded existence through economic empowerment and a direct role 
in national growth (Abu-Lughod, 2013). Based on the way in which western donors and 
policymakers portray global development goals and measure and compare progress among 
nations, it would appear that cultural factors and social norms have been to blame for developing 
countries’ difficult circumstances and for the low status of women within their economies and 
societies. However, as this thesis aims to show, these conditions are neither naturally occurring, 
nor do they exist in isolated, ahistorical context. Nor are they particularly easy to explain. 
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how notions of modernity and progress, 
which are the bases of modern economic and social development, are western-borne and not 
universally valued or easily implementable in the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) 
region. It is also my goal to demonstrate that the essentialist portrayal of women in this region is 
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insufficient ground for any exogenous intervention, let alone one so invasive and contested as 
“development.” It is important to note here that the particular way in which I use the term 
development throughout this investigation, unless otherwise specified, refers to the set of 
processes and interventions that seek to transform developing countries into replicas of 
industrialized societies in terms of economic productivity, social norms and human rights. In 
MENA, much of this narrative focuses on integrating Arab women into the public sphere and 
capitalizing on their economic potential. 
Given the alleged “gender paradox” of the region (World Bank, 2013 and Adely, 2013), 
where Arab women have become healthier and more educated but remain largely unemployed or 
underemployed, this is a call to question overly simplistic assumptions and explanations 
emanating mostly from western media and development doctrine. Instead of placing the usual 
blame on cultural and religious factors, which undoubtedly have impacts on women’s daily 
experiences, this thesis will present alternative evidence and commentaries that consider the 
complex and ever-evolving social and economic conditions of MENA, and how women in 
particular have lived through them. 
My thesis is also a stand against uncritical acceptance of words (terminology), labels 
(taxonomy) and ideas (epistemology) based on the often-ignored hierarchy of global knowledge 
that favors western narratives over others. I even acknowledge here that there are problems in my 
use of the terms “Arab women” or “Muslim women”, as these markers have a tendency to place 
identities upon individuals in Arabic-speaking and Muslim-majority countries with which they 
may not identify (Lazreg, 1994, p. 7). Let this be a disclaimer of my recognition that the 
countries of MENA are ethnically and religiously diverse, and that my use of these terms needs 
to be understood as a matter of convenience and convention in line with the discourse I am 
 
3 
 
analyzing.1 I also recognize the irony of using other restrictive labels such as developing or 
developed countries, when that is precisely one of the forms of ideological tyranny I am 
struggling against. 
  
Research Methods 
Through a postcolonial gender analysis of development issues and discourse inspired 
largely by anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod, who challenged her readers to rethink assumptions 
about the condition of Arab/Muslim women, I will explore how disparaging and essentialist 
attitudes towards Arab women have modern roots in the colonial era and have become more 
understated through the perceived benevolence of development discourse and practice. Much of 
the critique of colonialism comes from discursive analysis of colonial era texts (i.e., Edward 
Said’s account of Orientalism) culminating in Abu-Lughod’s critique of the 2005 Arab Human 
Development Report (AHDR), as well as critical accounts of western intervention in the colonial 
Middle East, especially regarding the impacts on gender relations. 
Based on Abu-Lughod’s model, I am performing empirical research using my own 
observations about word choice to analyze a World Bank report and Human Development Index 
materials. To counter some of the free market arguments that much of the authoritative western 
viewpoints represent, I will draw from feminist economist critiques of data gathered at a national 
level. To demonstrate the damage done in the name of economistic ideologies, I will refer to 
anthropological accounts of low-income Arab women’s survival tactics from the 1980s, as well 
as more recent research looking at alternatives to women’s formal labor force participation and 
poverty coping strategies such as informal work and social/charitable networks. 
                                                 
1 In other words, I recognize the problematic way in which labels such as “Arab” and “Muslim” are applied and 
conflated with one another when referring to individuals and groups. 
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Development and its Institutions2 
We can’t begin to understand the effects of development on MENA without first grasping 
some of the main theories in question and the institutions that promote western ideas in the 
region, both discursively and in practice. Firstly, the primary driver of development is the desire 
for and aim towards achieving a state of futurity; i.e., modernity, or progress. Much of the 
intellectual and technological strides made in Europe and North America during the Scientific 
Revolution, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution were attributed to the theory of 
environmental determinism, where certain physical environments are thought to enable superior 
human intelligence and faster progress than others; and the Cartesian rationalism of western 
thought, which is viewed as more sophisticated than that of other cultures due to its ability to 
employ logical, clear reasoning (which is also believed to be an attribute of the male mind). 
Based on these assumptions, modernization theory came as an explicit, antithetical 
response to the Soviet threat beginning in the 20th century, gaining steam in the 1940s through 
the rise of Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Exemplified by economist W.W. Rostow’s 1960 model entitled The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, which insisted that development occurs linearly and in 
stages ranging from traditional to highly consumptive societies, this process was assumed to be 
universally applicable without consideration of historical contexts, geography or social norms. 
This drive for modernity, based on the template of an industrialized western society, relies upon 
technological advances and industries that are structured around urban centers and white-collar 
skillsets. Through the modernization model, the world became further symbolically divided into 
regions representing progress (the West) and backwardness (the rest). The free market economy 
                                                 
2 All information referenced is from Peet and Hartwick (2015), unless otherwise cited. 
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was also to play a role in poorer states’ development, because the spread of technologies required 
their openness to western investment, aid, and corporate activity. 
The concept of economic neoliberalism – also known as ‘free-market economics’ – is 
similarly normative and aligned with a western model of growth. Essentially a revival of 19th 
century liberal economics that touted the power of the free market and was based on egoistic 
values, this strain of economic thought came to the political foreground in the 1970s as a critique 
of Socialism and state-led (Keynesian) growth. It was also a tangible set of processes to address 
accumulation of unproductive capital in western banks in the preceding decades, acting as a shift 
in material relations that ultimately benefitted western capitalists: what Marxist geographer 
David Harvey (2005, p. 16) referred to as “a project to achieve the restoration of class power”. 
Due to the timing of neoliberalism’s ascent, when fiscally conservative governments were in 
power in Europe and the US, state intervention in economies and development was largely 
abandoned in favor of free trade and economic liberalization, at least as far as elites in the 
powerful capitalist nations were concerned. Some supporters of neoliberalism even blamed the 
economic crises and anti-war movements of the 1960s through 1980s, in part, on overly generous 
welfare states, though the true causes are much more complex. 
In development policy, neoliberal ideals solidified into the Washington Consensus, where 
senior US government officials as well as technocrats of the Washington-based International 
Financial Institutions adopted policy prescriptions for developing countries who borrow from 
these entities. To the political right, the Consensus was an intoxicating cocktail of deregulation, 
liberalization of trade, openness to foreign direct investment, privatization and reduction of 
government spending. Functionally, these measures were thrust upon the Global South through 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs), the conditionality placed on countries borrowing from 
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the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to follow the prescriptions of the 
Consensus in exchange for debt relief and development assistance. Since their inception in the 
1980s, the SAPs have failed at stimulating economic growth, and created conditions that were 
unfavorable to the lower classes and to women. It remains unclear what policies or ideologies 
will replace SAPs and neoliberalism in the future. As of now, some of the Washington 
Consensus policy prescriptions are still evident in poverty alleviation (and even gender equality) 
discourse targeting MENA, which will be shown in the textual analysis later in this thesis. 
  
Thesis Structure 
Beginning in Chapter 2, I will argue that colonial interests and Orientalist views have 
contributed to modern development agendas and discourses that target women in the Arab world, 
presenting these women as a unitary group subject to antiquated cultural practices while erasing 
any culpability of the former colonizers in creating these conditions of poverty and gender 
inequality that development seeks to remedy. In Chapter 3, I will use Abu-Lughod’s analysis of 
the AHDR 2005 as a basis for examining a 2013 World Bank report that focuses on the 
underrepresentation of women in MENA economies using highly normative, technocratic 
language while overlooking the intrinsic virtues and human welfare aspects of gender parity. I 
will also cover some of the more complex factors that inhibit women’s labor force participation 
in the region, which the report did not address. Lastly, in Chapter 4, I will argue that pro-market 
narratives expounded largely by economists and sympathetic policymakers have been 
historically exclusionary to women, especially the global standards for measuring national 
economic activity, and are therefore inappropriate for intervention. I will also show the harm 
caused by neoliberal ideology in practice, and the coping strategies of the women affected. In 
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particular, I will show that the MENA presence of informal sector work and both formal and 
informal social institutions, which have provided support for poorer women in deteriorating 
circumstances, reflect the failure of these economic models. 
As the title of this thesis suggests, I approach my arguments with a historical lens focused 
on the lasting impacts of modern western imperialism in the MENA region. Given this aim, 
throughout this work I will examine the following manifestations of colonialism: as physical 
colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries; as suppression of indigenous knowledge in favor of 
scientific, western knowledge; as speaking on behalf of Arab women and making general 
assumptions about their behaviors, desires and motivations; as ignorance of the West’s 
contribution to social, economic and political problems; and as the power to restructure 
economies in ways that hurt poor households and women in particular. I will begin in the next 
chapter with the first and most obvious manifestation. 
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Chapter 2 
Colonialism, Orientalism and Essentialist Views of Arab Women 
 
Introduction 
It is difficult to go any significant length of time without reading or hearing a story in the 
media about the predicament of women in the Arab world. As with women in the rest of the 
developing world, this group is also commonly featured in international development and human 
rights discourses. One notorious example of this was a speech by former First Lady Laura Bush 
nearly 15 years ago, which resulted in a conflation of Islam and terrorism that aimed to “justify 
American military intervention in Afghanistan” and, in particular, to save Muslim women from 
this singular form of oppression (Abu-Lughod, 2013, p. 32). Perhaps less conspicuously in 2015 
alone, major reports were issued by international agencies affiliated with the United Nations 
(UN) such as “Arab Women and Legalization”3, “Global Employment Trends for Youth 2015”4, 
and “Arab Regional Synthesis Report on the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action 
Twenty Years Later”5, all of which reiterated the inequalities between the sexes regarding many 
issues in the region, with a particular emphasis on poverty, rights and women’s economic 
participation. 
However, “understandings” about this demographic that have enabled fascination, 
scholarship and intervention of the West – ideas of victimhood and uniformity of condition – are 
neither harmless nor ahistorical, especially when this knowledge is operationalized through 
                                                 
3 All websites cited are accurate as of April 2016.  
UN Women and UNDP, January 2015: http://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2015/all/arab-
women-and-legalization  
4 ILO, October 2015: http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/youth/2015/WCMS_412015/lang--
en/index.htm 
5 UNESCWA, UN Women and LAS, 2015: http://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-
library/publications/2015/all/the-implementation-of-the-beijing-platform 
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international development initiatives that affect the lives of these women while reinforcing their 
passivity in the eyes of the world. The supposedly benevolent concern for this Other may also be 
a distraction from western political missteps in the Arab world or even domestically; in her book, 
Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (2013) criticized the West’s 
obsession with the plight of Muslim women and the tendency to blame culture and religion 
instead of historical, global and political causes for their oppression, such as the American role in 
supporting repressive regimes in the Middle East. Likewise, Edward Said attributed the 
widespread acrimony towards the Arab Other in the US as a distraction from internal injustices 
experienced in America daily at the hands of the government (Jhally, 1998). 
Miriam Cooke (2000) put forth a striking statement about the postcolonial transformation 
of control when she claimed that “decolonization eliminates the physical representation of 
power, but in its ruins linger the seeds of a new hegemony that retains its base in the Euro-
American sphere but that has assumed the anonymity of global capital and culture” (p. 156). 
European colonialism has had a lasting influence on the social, economic and political systems 
of the MENA region, as well as the attitudes held about Arabs by the West (and about the West 
by Arabs), even though Europe’s direct rule of these countries is no longer a factor. Looking at 
the recent history of Arab women’s marginalization, beginning with colonialism and the 
ideology of Orientalism that provided its justification, is especially important because of the 
unknowingly ethnocentric discourses in modern international development (McEwan, 2008) that 
favor a western worldview of modernity and women’s rights (Abu-Lughod, 2009). 
This chapter will argue that these opinions of Arabs held by many in the West today are 
the ideological descendants of a lengthy history of inimical relations and racism that gained 
particular strength through the Orientalist scholarship purveyed by European colonizers in the 
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Middle East. This state-sanctioned typecasting of Arabs and Muslims of both genders by 
European officials, artists and intellectuals was especially important in shaping the social, 
economic and political atmosphere for women living in the region today, particularly regarding 
the gendered divide between public and private spaces. As it is often stated that international 
economic development is a form of neocolonialism, women in the Arab world have had a 
considerable disadvantage throughout this process, and especially through the international 
language of development, which has a tendency to overgeneralize the disparate circumstances 
and values of women who are as complex and dissimilar from one another as in any developed 
nation. In the upcoming sections I will provide a background on the concepts of colonialism and 
Orientalism as they relate to the people of the MENA region. I will then offer examples of how 
these concepts and structures have taken hold in western scholarship to the disadvantage of Arab 
women. Lastly, I will argue that the tendency to denigrate this demographic and fixate on the 
backwardness of their culture has persisted in a more subtle form through modern development 
discourse.  
  
Colonialism and Orientalism 
In his groundbreaking 1978 work, Orientalism, Edward Said argued that the intellectual 
concept of Orientalism was not a result of impartial observation and data gathering about the 
Orient, but rather was a process that reflected the interests of those who sought this knowledge.  
As such, the outcome of this systematic, “objective” and scientific process of archiving 
inevitably distorted the reality of life in the so-called Orient, specifically in the region with which 
Said was familiar: the Middle East. Through textual analysis of popular literature and art 
produced throughout the colonial period, he argued it is possible to see that (mis)conceptions 
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about Arabs and the Middle East did not vary much over time, lending to a perceived “image 
outside of history”, to quote Said (Jhally, 1998). Although Orientalism is often understood as a 
product of European literary and artistic (non-scholarly) depictions that exoticized the peoples 
and cultures of the Near and Far East during colonial exploration, for the purposes of this thesis I 
use the term to refer more generally to the views held by colonial powers of their subjects as the 
backward and inescapably different “Other”; i.e., incapable of conducting their own affairs and 
thus requiring European intervention (Keddie, 2007).  
In his introduction, Said explained Orientalism in a way that resonates fully with the 
postcolonial analysis of development institutions and discourse undertaken in this thesis. He 
claimed that the “corporate institution” of Orientalism took on the Orient “by making statements 
about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, 
Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the 
Orient” (p. 3). The mindset of Orientalism, then, had lasting intellectual, material and social 
consequences in MENA. 
Egypt, which was a British protectorate from 1882-1954 (Cammett et al., 2015) and is 
currently a large recipient of international aid (Harrigan and El Said, 2009), was a key focal point 
of Orientalist knowledge acquisition during the 19th and early 20th centuries due to its geographic 
location between Europe and the Far East. According to Said (1978), Egypt and the Islamic lands 
were like a “laboratory” for the West’s Oriental knowledge (p. 43), and through this 
experimentation, Egypt had much of its modern history “annexed” to Britain’s (p. 85). The 
distortion of Middle Eastern historiography, which flourished during colonialism, could be 
attributed to the fact that a great number of historians were traditionally Western men writing in 
languages other than Arabic “for the use and edification of foreigners” (Humphreys, 2006, p. 
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24). An early example of this would be the massive, twenty-three volume Description de 
l’Égypte (1808-1828), in which Napoleon’s team of scientists and historians catalogued and 
translated into modern French practically everything they believed could be documented about 
Egypt at that time (Said, 1978).  
In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, as evidenced by Description de l’Égypte, French 
scientists and intellectuals undertook massive documentation of Egypt’s culture, history and 
natural environment, although Egypt was unable to reciprocate with any kind of systematic 
acquisition of knowledge on France (Jhally, 1998). According to Said, “Egypt was to become a 
department of French learning” (p. 83), suggesting that the Western archival of Middle Eastern 
knowledge was not for the immediate benefit of its native residents. From the outset, then, 
knowledge about Egypt was ossified under the auspices of European prowess, primarily for the 
advantage of Europeans. In addition to knowledge accumulation, channels of disseminating 
knowledge within Europe’s occupied territories were also subject to colonial control: where 
education of the natives was allowed, subjects in schools were often dictated by colonial choice 
(Charlton, 1997) and limited to children of indigenous elites (Cammett et al., 2015), thus priming 
the Arab world for a present day in which it is difficult to determine how much knowledge is 
indigenous and how much is foreign. 
During the colonial period, France assessed that Egypt was “plunged into barbarism”, and 
lamented this largely because it was once home to a great civilization (Said, 1978, p. 85). 
Although much of the focus here has been on France, Britain had a longer period of influence in 
Egypt, and its stance on Arab inferiority was just as pronounced. In Orientalism, Said observed 
some of the viewpoints of Arthur James Balfour and Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), who were 
dignitaries during the time of the British protectorate in Egypt, concluding that Britain’s aim of 
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saving Egypt from its own backwardness was plain to see in speeches and communications of 
high-ranking officials. For example, Balfour justified British reign over Egypt as being for the 
greater good, indicating that “[w]e are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians...we are 
there also for the sake of Europe at large” (as quoted in Said, 1978, p. 33). 
Timothy Mitchell (2000) proposed that through colonial discourse, the alleged 
backwardness of the colonized populations was attributed by colonizers as a “weakness of the 
mental power of representation” (p. 21); an intrinsic cognitive deficiency among the lesser races 
that prevented them from understanding abstractions that the Europeans were well capable of 
grasping. This conviction of intellectual superiority authorized the colonizers to undertake the 
representation and evaluation of the MENA region themselves. Integral to the Orientalist 
attitudes that sanctioned colonialism, this assumed superiority is what enabled eurocentric 
discourses of western rationalism to prevail up to present day (Peet and Hartwick, 2015). 
However, the basis of Europe’s hegemony was in the strategic colonial plunder of other 
societies’ natural sources of wealth, rather than any biological or intellectual advantage (Blaut, 
1976). 
An obvious point of divergence between the West and the Arab world is religion. 
Although the conflict between Islam and Christianity dates back to the Crusades (Keddie, 2007), 
the modern bias against Islamic epistemology took hold during colonialism. Looking at 
religion’s role in the imperial agenda, Said (1978) put forth that Egypt was used to bring the 
Orient closer to Europe and to diminish the abnormality and perceived enmity of Islam. One 
mechanism of this attempt to curb Islam’s influence, for example, was when the colonial powers 
explicitly tried undermining the religion by educating Egyptian women in French missionary 
schools (Ahmed, 1989). According to Nikki Keddie (2007), although Protestant Christian 
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missionaries were prohibited from converting Muslims, they were “among the pioneers in 
educating Muslim girls” (p. 59), thus disseminating and reinforcing western attitudes in the 
Muslim world through the ostensible generosity of a formal education. 
In French colonial Maghreb6 – Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria – ethno-religious identity 
was given priority over national identity for talking about the indigenous subjects, where the 
different faiths were referred to by the French as “musulmans or juifs indigene”7 (Cooke, 2000, 
p. 155). Miriam Cooke attributed this prioritization to the historic conflation of religion and 
civilization in Europe, dating back to the 14th and 15th centuries. According to her, “at a certain 
stage” (p. 155) during the colonial period Jews were granted French citizenship but Muslims 
were not, reinforcing a message that Muslims were not European material. For these and other 
Arabs who lived through the colonial period, religion understandably “served as a historical 
marker of belonging” (p. 156). Within a geospatial imagination, the tension between cultures 
strengthened the imaginative divide between East and West, while simultaneously widening the 
separation between genders within the local communities. I will next look at how Arab gender 
relations, in particular, were affected by colonialism. 
  
Gender in the Colonial Middle East 
The physical processes of colonialism, in which a company of foreigners enters a 
territory without permission to assert control over its resources and inhabitants, have gendered 
undertones of sexual violation and physical domination. In the words of Said, by pioneering new 
lands for the benefit of imperial expansion and knowledge acquisition, the Europeans utilized 
                                                 
6 European presence in these three countries began with France conquering Algeria in 1830. It then made Tunisia 
(1881) and Morocco (1912) its protectorates. Formalized European control in the Maghreb ended between the mid-
1950s and 1962 (Keddie, 2007; Cammett et al., 2015).  
7 Indigenous Muslims/Jews. 
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their advantageous and masculine “freedom of intercourse” which could “penetrate...the great 
Asiatic mystery” (1978, p. 44). Using identical sexual imagery, Algerian sociologist Marnia 
Lazreg opined that French authors discursively “could...penetrate Algerian men’s intimate life by 
having their wives and daughters as spoils of conquest” (1994, p. 39). 
Examining stereotypes of Muslim women in Egypt that date back to the colonial period, 
Leila Ahmed (1982) put forth that Western ethnocentrism was also responsible for replicating 
certain female images that have negative connotations, such as the confinement of the harem, the 
injustices of polygamy, and the invisibility of the veil. By using these limiting and 
misunderstood symbols of Arab femininity, colonial agents and Orientalist artists and authors 
engaged in normative processes that painted Arab society and Muslims as backwards, portraying 
the women as passive victims of their own ignorance and Muslim men’s barbarism. Nikki 
Keddie (2007) asserted that focusing on these men’s mistreatment of women was an intentional 
tactic of the colonizers to show that Arabs were incapable of autonomy. Through the description, 
circulation and institutionalization of this so-called knowledge, the West claimed its cultural 
authority over the Oriental Other (Said, 1978).  
This ill-conceived attempt at representation has had impacts on both genders: for 
example, Jordanian women and Bedouin men of colonial Jordan8 were lumped together in the 
European administrators’ imaginations – comparably envisioned as both traditional and spatially 
isolated from society. Jordanian-Palestinian scholar, Joseph Massad (2001), described them both 
as a “different species of citizens” (p. 51), with special attention paid to Bedouin men’s feminine 
attributes that justified the British colonial administration’s undertaking to settle and incorporate 
this population into Jordanian society and the military. Interestingly, Massad explained that the 
Oriental mystique of Bedouin culture and historic landmarks like Petra were transformed by the 
                                                 
8 This period lasted from roughly 1919 until independence in 1946 (Massad, 2001). 
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British Mandate authorities into thriving tourist attractions that reinforce this image of 
traditionalism – an exaggerated and overly romantic representation of idyllic desert heritage that 
represents a “colonial, not a national” tradition. To this day, according to Massad, Jordanians 
simultaneously embrace this tradition as part of their culture and rebuke it in the face of global 
pressures of modernization (p. 75). 
Expanding upon the spatial isolation of Arab women during colonialism, Miriam Cooke 
(2000) asserted that their removal from occupied public spaces and exclusion from history was a 
strategy to gain Muslim men’s acquiescence under colonial rule. She also added that this 
gendered segregation and marginalization of Arab women under colonialism was a basis for their 
current weak relationship to global capital and culture. This would suggest that, despite popular 
belief to the contrary, the reasons for Arab women’s economic underperformance and other poor 
development indicators are in large part due to the functional outcomes of historic external 
pressures, not simply caused by cultural or religious considerations from within their societies. 
In a literary representation of colonial experience in the Maghreb, Islamic feminist 
scholar Leila Ahmed (1982) described an Algerian novel in which men were “colonized in the 
street”, while the Arab woman’s domain of the home was a safe space that no foreigner could 
trespass, and this dichotomy increased women’s passivity (p. 164).  Arabic literary expert, 
Marilyn Booth (2006), suggested that in both Palestine and Egypt, the concepts of women’s 
honor and shame were likewise invoked in opposition to the encroaching imperialist threat, and 
the use of honor in this resistance “was articulated as community preservation” (p. 216). The 
conflation of community welfare with women’s purity suggests that both genders experienced a 
form of emasculation under occupation. 
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Perhaps this was a situation in which men saw the enclosure of women and protection of 
their virtue as an aspect of their lives still under their control, due to the unbroken sanctity of the 
woman’s space in the domestic realm. Comparative literary scholar Yaseen Noorani (2010) 
argued that the transformation of Arab femininity during colonialism was a tool for expressing 
newly emergent national ideals and identities, contrasting the qualities of this changing 
femininity through Arab women’s appearances in both classical and reformist literature. He 
deduced that in the classical arena, they were represented as “primordial, chaotic desire” (p. 
109), and the new Arab woman, through a Victorian-era, bourgeois relegation to the private 
sphere, stood for the “negation of desire”; a crucial ingredient for the new moral ordering of anti-
colonial resistance and the edification of the new nation-state (p. 109). 
This sense of inferiority conferred upon women was not limited to individuals or 
families: the pejorative images of women and more “traditional” aspects of Arab culture ran in 
parallel to the subjugation and feminization of the former power structures of the colonized 
territories. In that respect, Fatima Mernissi (1991) described the colonial Muslim state as “veiled, 
obliterated, nonexistent” (p. 21). In a similar fashion, Amir Abdullah of Jordan expressed to the 
Syrians in a 1920 communication that the colonizers had robbed the Arabs of their “faith, 
freedom, and masculinity” (Massad, 2001, p. 89). Abdullah also equated colonization with rape, 
which for men, in his view, was a process of emasculation and feminization akin to castration (p. 
89).  
Though the amir was referring to the former Ottoman occupation, in his chain of 
metaphors, colonialism and womanhood were one in the same, representing a lack of freedom in 
the burgeoning Arab states due to the European presence. Joseph Massad (2001) asserted that 
Abdullah’s concern with masculinity, in opposition to the colonial presence, was related more to 
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establishing “public morality” (p. 89) than gender identity, and that this contributed to the 
Jordanian government’s concern for women’s appearance and presence in the public sphere (i.e., 
being seen unveiled or wearing makeup), citing the Qur’an and soliciting support from religious 
leaders. The amir’s Islamic conservatism laid the groundwork for the state’s interest in gendered 
public behavior as way to solidify national character, since women’s appearance was targeted in 
particular as part of the “national inheritance of ‘conventional virtues’” (p. 90). While this 
doesn’t negate the argument that women’s status is due to religious and cultural norms, it does 
demonstrate that expectations and stereotypes of Arab/Muslim women may be influenced by 
external factors dating back to colonialism. Yet, as we will see in the next section, explanations 
used in much of the modern discourse are still crafted superficially without addressing the past in 
any meaningful way. 
  
Post-colonial Attitudes and Arab Women in Development 
The viewpoints of Orientalist scholars and European colonial agents towards their 
subjects may have been overtly racist or dehumanizing, but modern scholarship also has an 
effect on global imaginations, especially in regards to the status of non-western women. This 
effect may even prove to have more lasting power than old-fashioned Orientalism due to its 
beneficent, charitable aims. A certain insidious danger, however, lies within modern 
development discourse: as can be concluded from a critical view of colonialism and Orientalism, 
modern viewpoints (including the language used in development discourse) were informed by 
centuries of knowledge acquisition enabled by an imbalance of power and cultural authority. 
Additionally, targeted development initiatives at any scale other than the individual does not 
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have much capacity to address the complexities that define the inner lives, gender relations and 
social interchanges of the people who ultimately benefit from these efforts. 
Long outlasting its usefulness in the media as a Cold War marker of non-aligned, pre-
industrial (and in many cases, post-colonial) states, the persistent use of the term “Third World” 
in regard to women has had a homogenizing effect on this incredibly variegated and populous 
group, making it seem that all women in developing countries have unfortunate circumstances 
just because of the soil on which they were born or raised. Geographer Cheryl McEwan (2008) 
noted that this type of designation fails to recognize political and economic stratification within a 
population, and through this homogenization, a subtle process of Othering underlies the 
documents and dialogues of development.  An interesting assertion by Chandra Mohanty (1997) 
was that the singular “Third World Woman” is a natural byproduct of the “scientific inquiry” (p. 
86) that is inextricably tied to the processes of colonization in these countries. 
Although the qualifying term “Third World” seems to have fallen out of favor within 
international organizations, successors like “Least/Lesser Developed County” or “Low Income 
Country” still have an evaluative undercurrent that compares nations on a spectrum of wealth. 
By liberally using these terms, it is implied that these “lesser than” countries need to develop and 
accumulate a larger national income in order to advance. Naturally, these designations do not 
have the ability to enable a distant viewer to understand what life must be like for any particular 
individual in any country, let alone those that have had so much of their history and knowledge 
subsumed under a foreign culture. 
The assessments of essentialism and homogenization provided by McEwan (2008) and 
Mohanty (1997) prove useful when considering the particular concern for Arab and Muslim 
women, who, as we are apparently certain, are suffering to a greater extent under the primitive 
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conditions and patriarchal Islamic state structures depicted by the media and other institutions 
aligned with western political and economic interests. Said argued that this pathetic image of 
Middle Eastern peoples portrayed in western media has not been contested by Arab governments 
because of their dependence on American and European aid, in fear of jeopardizing its 
continuous delivery (Jhally, 1998). Unlike the former direct rule by European colonial powers, 
the dominant American influence of today is much more covert, but it has been politicized by a 
strong relationship with Israel. In Said’s view as a Palestinian, this western-oriented, anti-Arab 
state has thus influenced America’s version of Orientalism through the surreptitious omission of 
balanced viewpoints on Arabs and/or Islam (Jhally, 1998), which makes itself apparent in the 
depoliticized, pro-modernization language of development. 
Despite evidence that suggests there are significant impacts on Arab women’s poor 
participation in economies that stem from colonialism, the focus within international policy 
documents has remained on cultural and religious values that many scholars and development 
experts deem obstructive to social and national progress. In an analysis of the Arab Human 
Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World (“AHDR”), Lila Abu-
Lughod (2009) gave credit to its ambition and thoroughness. However, she lamented that despite 
the fact that many of the authors are intellectuals and activists from Arab countries, their 
cosmopolitan perspectives and support by the UN Development Program (UNDP) inevitably led 
to an “international dialect” of rights that is problematic and not necessarily applicable to non-
elites in the MENA region (p. 84). She stated that the report, in its entirety, painted all Arab 
women as uniform in their misfortune and unique from a global perspective, while it also implied 
that gender equality had been achieved in other places. 
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Abu-Lughod critiqued the report’s chapter on social structures, stating it lacked a 
historical context and denounced Arab women’s ties to family or tribe. It also argued women’s 
subordination within modern family hierarchies to be rooted in a timeless Islamic/Arabic origin, 
ignoring the possible role of industrialization, agricultural capitalism, state building, and 
colonialism. One of the main biases influencing the goals of development strategies in the 
Middle East, she asserted, is the undervaluation of traditional knowledge because it is considered 
substandard to a formal (i.e., western, scientific) education. The intellectuals who contributed to 
the AHDR report are most likely from the generation of Arabs who came of age during or after 
the period of modernization in the Middle East and, as such, tend to underestimate hereditary 
learning and skills (2009). 
A claim made in the report that disturbed Abu-Lughod was when the authors suggested 
that rural and nomadic girls’ illiteracy “erodes their very human status”, as it is assumed they do 
not know about human rights (p. 88). However, she also acknowledged that mere access to 
education does not necessarily guarantee its quality, concluding that both boys and girls suffer 
from poor public education in many cases due to state-level insufficiencies, not barriers based on 
gender. Reviewing the same AHDR report, Arab Studies scholar Fida Adely (2009) suggested 
that women’s preferences within Arab countries have not always matched the assumptions laid 
out in development programs when creating education frameworks, such as the focus on 
education for male-dominated, wage labored fields. 
Adely pointed out that the MENA region represents a “gender paradox” in the view of 
the World Bank (p. 108), where high educational attainment rates are mismatched with low labor 
force rates. She concluded that the report’s emphasis on capabilities and choice are misleading, 
because it doesn’t acknowledge larger issues and structural inequalities. Even with its efforts to 
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be progressive, such as its acknowledgment of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the war’s 
impact on women as a development target in the Arab world, it raised “the same middle-class, 
liberal ideal of modern women” (p. 108) who have the capacity to choose their own political 
engagements, status, fertility, and other opportunities if they are just given an adequate 
education. 
Adely thus conjectured, like Abu-Lughod, that the authors of the document engaged in a 
lengthy value judgment that favored a narrative of modernization, economic empowerment and 
formal employment. At the same time as it emphasized women’s apparent need for formalized 
education and entry into the workforce to bring the MENA region up to “universal” human 
development standards, it wrote off any other ways in which knowledge can be gained or utilized 
that are authentic to (and desired by) the women who are the targets of development. In 
summary, Abu-Lughod and Adely both emphasized that, despite good intentions, the language 
used in the report came from privileged, western-influenced perspectives. Adely even asserted 
that the human development approach is not a “significant departure from earlier 
conceptualizations of development” (p. 109).  Thus it seems that the epistemological dilemma 
put forth by postcolonial critics may not be overcome when international institutions, born 
largely of North American and European efforts and funding, are the main catalysts for driving 
policy and investing in development. 
  
Conclusion 
As evidenced by the critiques of scholars focusing on the colonial era to the modern day, 
portrayals of backwardness in the Arab/Muslim world that originated in an Orientalist ideology 
can help explain the essentialist way in which Arab women have been incorporated as a focal 
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point of modern development. Beginning with European knowledge overwriting an authentic 
representation of Arab history, colonialism also controlled the native populations’ education and 
deepened the divide between Islamic cultures and the West. The masculine aggression and threat 
of imperialism intensified the spatial isolation of Arab women and widened the public-private 
divide between the genders, and the Muslim state was even likened to a weakened or castrated 
man who underwent a process of feminization from the Europeans’ rearrangement of power. 
Evolving out of this era came a homogenous, underdeveloped (pun intended) view of the 
MENA region and its inhabitants. Influenced by conflicting political allegiances with the Arabs’ 
regional and ideological foe, Israel, western biases have circumscribed the portrayals of Arabs in 
the media and made their way more indistinctly into the language and aims of development. 
From a wide, unfocused lens, Arab women have been universally portrayed as disadvantaged 
throughout this entire process, victimized by the West due to the perceived backwardness of 
Islam and patriarchal nature of Arab societies. A more careful and critical consideration of the 
history of the Middle East will show, however, that many of the conditions that development 
projects aim to repair are a result of the same political powers’ interventions just a century or two 
earlier. In the following chapter, based on Abu-Lughod and Adely’s critiques of the AHDR 
2005, I will analyze some of the discourse in more recent development documents from the UN 
and World Bank to show that the biases towards western development models are very much still 
present in the second decade of the 21st century. 
  
 
 
  
 
24 
 
Chapter 3 
Discursive Analysis of a Development Document on Arab/MENA Women 
 
Introduction 
In the powerful business of international development and the fuzzy, ill-defined contours 
of globalization, knowledge is power. Despite a marked shift in mainstream development 
discourse away from pure modernization theory of the 1950s through 1970s (Peet and Hartwick, 
2015), much of the information that drives development is derived from often misleading 
national statistics (Benería, 1981; Waring, 1988). Additionally, well into the 21st century, the 
scholarship that produces and disperses the ideas promoted through development discourse is 
still predominantly informed by neoliberal economic theory (Abu-Lughod, 2009). Because much 
of the globalization research focused on the Arab world is sponsored by the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), it reproduces pro-globalization viewpoints that do not fully 
appreciate the political and social repercussions that increasing economic integration can create 
(Harrigan and El-Said, 2009).  
Due to the influence of the World Bank’s scholarship in reinforcing these neoliberal 
values, in this chapter I will be drawing inspiration from the critiques of the 2005 Arab Human 
Development Report (AHDR) report by Lila Abu-Lughod and Fida Adely (2009) to analyze a 
similarly normative document released in 2013 by the World Bank Group (“the Bank”), entitled 
MENA Development Report, Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle 
East and North Africa, which I will refer to hereafter as the “Opening Doors” report. I will also 
begin with a brief overview and analysis of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), a 
composite measurement that has inspired many of the claims made in the report.  
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Like Abu-Lughod and Adely, I argue that even the more “progressive” concepts in 
mainstream development (such as the measuring of HDI) as well as the positions espoused by 
the Bank are eurocentric, dependent upon econometric models of assessing development, and as 
a result are uncritical, ahistorical and incomplete. In the following sections, I challenge the bias 
towards quantifiability, and provide a conceptual and textual analysis of the Opening Doors 
report based on some of its key arguments. For contrast, I also include more cultured 
explanations of the infamous MENA gender gap in employment based on research that is 
oriented toward political science, sociology, anthropology and feminist scholarship rather than 
purely economics.  
 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
After decades of focusing on national income growth as the determinant of 
developmental achievement, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) adopted the 
Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990 to capture a wider range of measurements that might 
give insight into quality of life beyond just financial well-being (UNDP HDI website9 and 
White, 2008). According to the UNDP, this approach is meant to represent a “qualitative life”10, 
which today includes myriad dimensions such as life expectancy and quality, knowledge, 
political participation, human rights, security, environmental sustainability and gender equality. 
This plurality is also referred to as the “Capabilities Approach” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 18), as it 
aims to enable individuals to achieve their potential, with a particular emphasis on individual 
freedom and choice, and a respect for human dignity and justice.  
                                                 
9 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/what-human-development.  
10 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/what-human-development 
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The Capabilities Approach (or HDI; however the concept is referenced) has ultimately 
sought to alter the paths and discourses of development (Nussbaum, 2011). It is perhaps ironic 
that the existence and promotion of the HDI demonstrates the global community’s need for 
quantification, even of supposedly qualitative characteristics. Despite this potential incongruity, 
the evolution of development towards this more holistic vision was well warranted, and 
demonstrates the fruits of the research that helped shift development, in whatever way possible, 
away from its narrow roots in post-WWII economic recovery and growth (Binns, 2008).  
The way in which these more comprehensive HDI assessments are distributed to the 
global community is through the Human Development Report (HDR), which has been issued 
annually by UNDP since 1990 (Nussbaum, 2011). Additional country-level reports are issued 
less frequently, and the regional HDRs, such as the 2005 AHDR mentioned in Chapter 2, are less 
frequent as well. According to UNDP, the AHDR, which was first published in 2002, arose out 
of the concern for the future of the Arab world amid the geopolitical and military intervention 
that was precipitating at the turn of the millennium.11 Accordingly, it can be interpreted from the 
source that global political factors influence the dissemination of HDI via the timing and 
distribution of the AHDRs. 
When perusing the current UNDP website for Human Development Reports under the 
Country Profiles section (see Figure 2 for examples)12, visitors will encounter a sleek, interactive 
choropleth map featuring soothing shades of blue that visually distinguish the four groupings of 
“Human Development” on a continuum: Very High (navy), High (bold blue), Medium (lighter 
blue), and Low (the lightest blue). The data used in this particular infographic were those 
                                                 
11 http://www.arab-hdr.org/about/intro.aspx 
12 http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries 
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represented in the most recent (2015) Human Development Report. The website, as well as the 
information represented, is well groomed and visually appealing. 
From browsing the website, it is also clear that methodologies of capturing human 
development statistics are not static. For example, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 
was used for the first time in the 2010 HDR, with the intent of representing non-income factors 
of poverty (“overlapping deprivations”) such as child mortality, nutrition, assets, sanitation, and 
more. The expansive sources for these calculations could be overwhelming to the layperson, 
especially when demonstrated in a flow diagram (Figure 1)13. Further probing into the 
methodologies and components of HDI calculations may actually create more confusion due to 
the complexity and interrelated factors with which the UNDP creates these composite 
evaluations.   
 
 
Figure 1: Excerpt from 2015 HDR Technical notes 
  
                                                 
13 Accessed from: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2015_technical_notes.pdf  
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Figure 2: Choropleth country maps of International Human Development Indicators, 2015 HDR 
 
Timothy Mitchell (2000) argued that numerical representations of the nebulous State 
entity, outside of mere geographic delineation, have made it possible to compare and categorize 
nations. Indeed, when I – a reluctantly patriotic American – visited the interactive HDI 
choropleth map for the first time, it was impossible not to hover my cursor over the navy blue 
shape of the United States without thinking “why isn’t my country number one?!” (it is currently 
ranked eighth). When seduced by quantitative figures and slick infographics, it is all too easy to 
forget that these indicators are not wholly representative of reality, yet upon reflection it should 
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seem obvious that they are mere abstractions and generalizations, unable to fully demonstrate the 
diverse economic, social and political circumstances that women and men experience in any 
region, let alone a region such as MENA, where the champions of these statistics (mostly 
western policymakers) have little, if any, expertise.  
Measuring and attempting to comprehend the world in such a way helps reinforce the 
values that international norm-setting organizations, such as the UN, suggest are universal. This 
includes those represented with the HDI indicators: economic productivity, high life expectancy, 
high education levels, and equal access between women and men to these benefits. However 
desirable these values might be to any particular person, the basic scale with which they are 
represented – by country – is problematic. At the personal (individual) level, it suggests citizens’ 
complicity in such a categorization, as if they had a choice in their nationality, or that by getting 
an education and participating productively in their national economy, they are contributing to 
the betterment of the state and its performance in respect to all others. At the international level, 
these measurements give the impression of the state as an isolated entity that is fully in control of 
(and responsible for) its own progress.  
Martha Nussbaum suggested that the nation holds “moral importance” (2011, p. 113) for 
its people, as citizens’ entitlements are outlined in constitutions, and that the focus upon the state 
is a matter of convenience when determining which entity is responsible for developing human 
capabilities. Regardless of which delimitation is appropriate to measure human capability, when 
reviewing HDI measurements across a region or across the globe, the inequalities are glaring and 
ought to raise questions about how they came to be. Statistics alone will not tell us anything 
about historical processes; yet the UN and numerous other large and small institutions accept 
these rankings uncritically as impetus for action. Anthropologist Tania Li described this 
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reductionist tendency in development as the process of “rendering technical” (2005, p. 389), 
whereby complex social issues are made more tangible and less political by outlining specific 
boundaries and measurements to justify both a problem’s diagnosis and the prescriptive 
measures for intervention. The institution that will be analyzed here is the World Bank, which 
provides extensive and influential scholarship to the development community, often using the 
concepts of HDI to promote its pro-market stance.  
 
World Bank MENA Report 201314 
As a major International Financial Institution (IFI) with considerable resources, the 
mission statement of the World Bank includes two main goals: to “End extreme poverty within a 
generation and boost shared prosperity”15. Given these priorities, the Bank has appointed itself as 
the “leading expert on poverty” (Harcourt, 2009, p. 19), a topic that has became particularly 
salient since 2000, when the Millennium Development Goals were devised as the dominant 
development framework for the UN. Given this importance, the Bank maintains its influential 
position in the development industry (Harcourt, 2009). Aside from lending power and a 
historical role as the mechanism that provided financing for reconstruction after the Second 
World War, it sustains this dominance in part through its prolific output and dissemination of 
knowledge – including nearly a quarter of a million documents and reports available to the 
public, searchable online16. Its publications cover diverse topics, and, according to the 
publications website, they “are primarily aimed at policy makers, development practitioners, 
academics and university students, and the business community”17. 
                                                 
14 All references and quotes are from the World Bank MENA report (2013), unless otherwise cited. 
15 http://www.worldbank.org/en/about  
16 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home  
17 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWBP/Resources/aboutus.html  
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 The Opening Doors report of 2013 that will be explored herein was drafted as a regional 
companion for the much broader World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and 
Development, which aimed to reduce female mortality, increase their educational and economic 
participation as well as their voice and agency, and reduce social inequality over time.18 Given 
these intentions, it can be concluded that the Opening Doors report would be utilized, at least, by 
national governments and nongovernmental organizations accountable for implementing the 
Bank-funded projects that target gender in the MENA region. It drew from human development 
concepts, using HDI measurements to compare women’s status among MENA countries and to 
compare the whole of MENA to other regions, concluding that the only tangible progress made 
towards gender equality was in health and education and some rights-based reforms underway, 
but much work was still to be done.  
Analyzing mostly legal and cultural barriers, the report aimed to illuminate the reasons 
for the gender gap in the rights and access to formal job markets despite high educational 
achievements; a situation that is referred in the report to as the “MENA puzzle” (p. 12) or the 
“gender equality paradox” (p. 3). Although many fair and carefully considered arguments were 
included on behalf of Arab women, such as the recognition that political participation and legal 
justice are essential for achieving more gender equitable societies, the Opening Doors report 
presented these as means to an economic end, and the preferred language represented a 
neoliberal, income-oriented perspective that did not address historical processes or global 
interventions that helped create the paradox it so often references. I will now provide an 
overview of the major themes of the report and associated arguments, providing insight into 
some of the counterarguments the report obscured, followed by a brief analysis of terminology to 
illustrate the report’s macroeconomic biases.    
                                                 
18 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4391 
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Education and (Un)employment: 
As stated earlier, although the authors praise the advancements made in MENA regarding 
literacy and higher educational enrollment rates for girls and women in primary, secondary and 
tertiary settings over the past several decades, it lamented the low quality of education and 
teachers, citing these as factors of the low economic participation for women. From page 38 of 
the report: “Poor school facilities, inadequate teacher training, and a lack of female teachers 
may have a disproportionate effect on girls’ completion rates.” This statement was presented 
rather briefly, and in an isolated view of the region without any additional reflection as to the 
cause of these alleged deficiencies. Unsurprisingly, it glossed over how public education in 
MENA, as in many other developing regions that have received conditional loans from IFIs such 
as the Bank, has suffered since roughly the end of the Cold War due to governmental budget cuts 
that came as a result of the conditions imposed by IFIs through their structural adjustment 
programs and the subsequent downsizing of the welfare state (Hoodfar, 1997; Clark, 2004; 
Harcourt, 2009). 
There were a large number of references to generally high female unemployment rates in 
MENA, especially in relation to higher educational levels and in relation to men, in order to 
highlight the gender gap within the region and compare to the rest of the world. The dominant 
explanation provided was that the Arab state governments had invested too much in expanding 
the public sector, which was unable to keep pace with population growth and the rise in educated 
job seekers. It also stated that the public sector is where the highest concentration of desirable 
and “gender appropriate” (p. 38) or “female friendly” (p. 19) jobs for women exist, such as 
administrative and teaching fields. It used these descriptions of gender relevance to generalize 
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women’s preferences in this region and to make connections to the low labor rates, without 
acknowledging that the public sector – as mentioned above regarding education – has been 
constrained by the very policies dictated by conditional financing imposed on these states by the 
IFIs. The report did also cite more practical reasons for women preferring government work, 
such as better job security, pay and working hours; yet, it repeatedly criticized the MENA 
governments for their unsustainable public sector hiring practices, and even criticized policies 
that protect citizens, such as mandatory severance packages, pointing to “reduced...flexibility of 
the labor market” (p. 105). This language is unapologetically neoliberal, as severance pay and 
other forms of protection or benefits for laborers run counter to the interests of capital owners. 
The “flexibility of the labor market” suggests that the Bank believes MENA countries should 
promote a flexible (i.e., easily disposable and non-unionized) workforce (Peet and Hartwick, 
2015).  
 
Cultural and Legal Barriers: 
There were multiple references in the Opening Doors report to the restrictiveness of 
conservative and traditional gender norms, but with no mention of how authoritarian regimes and 
their Western support that have reinforced these ideologies in the region (Abu-Lughod, 2013; 
Tell, 2014); in fact, no attention was given to authoritarianism or oppressive political regimes at 
all. On page 10 of the report, its aim is clear: “This report argues that the Region’s conservative 
gender norms, its legal and institutional framework...lie at the heart of the puzzle of low rates of 
female participation in politics and the economy.” Here it can be noted that the authors 
concluded the “puzzle” can be solved by cultural explanations, with no further probing. To give 
credit to the report, however, it did acknowledge that these norms are not exclusive to MENA 
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and are evolving along with educational and demographic changes. It also cited research that 
drew conclusions between the oil boom and increased gender segregation, suggesting the authors 
were aware of the complex political economic environment influencing gender within largely 
Islamic value systems, but did not contribute any further analysis. 
The report included an entire chapter on legal systems in MENA countries in conjunction 
with the cultural values that work against women, concluding that these norms have been 
formalized through legal frameworks. It provided a comparison to women’s struggles for legal 
equality in seemingly more progressive states like Greece, Spain and Ireland, stating that in the 
1980s “in each of these countries, economic growth created new opportunities for women, while 
the legal and institutional frameworks created flexible work options and a conducive work 
environment for them” (p. 11). The aim of this comparison seems to be to highlight what the 
MENA region could be achieving. It cited examples in MENA such as labor laws that restrict 
women from certain industries, prioritization of government benefits for male heads of 
household, lax or absent punishment for domestic violence, discriminatory citizenship laws and 
the multitude of personal status laws that are usually enforced in courts associated with the 
various religious sects. It even acknowledged the colonial roots of some modern legislation and 
that inequality before the law is not unique to MENA. However, the authors did not go so far as 
to question whether the imposition of western law in Muslim majority societies was appropriate, 
nor did it acknowledge the gendered division of these pluralistic legal systems – i.e., how the 
various sects’ religious laws tend to be associated with the private sphere and the European 
codes linked to the public sphere (Massad, 2001). 
The report mentioned illiteracy and lack of awareness, especially in poor rural areas, as 
hindering the implementation of laws that would protect women’s rights. The authors made it a 
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point to include the following quote from a Yemeni village woman: “We are illiterate. We don’t 
know what’s going on. We don’t know what you are talking about” (p. 84). Abu-Lughod (2013) 
would caution against this tendency to assign universal notions of rights through legal 
frameworks, as these initiatives may attempt to oversimplify the complex circumstances that 
women negotiate every day. Citing her ethnographic evidence from rural Egypt, she stated that 
notions of rights and legal representation are often foreign concepts that have little influence on 
women’s realities in these locations, and that even such seemingly clear-cut situations as 
domestic violence need to be put into context of individual bargains and choices. As Abu-
Lughod’s AHDR critique (2009) focused on the “dialects” of development, such as the presumed 
universality of rights, a brief dissection of some of the Opening Doors terminology is warranted. 
 
Language:  
While plodding through the near 200-page (cover to cover) publication, the repetitiveness 
of certain ideas became progressively more apparent, validating at least a cursory review of this 
language to illustrate how the Bank’s ideological preferences were iterated in the report. Words 
conveying neoliberal economic concepts as well as value-laden terms that emphasize difference 
were aplenty. Terms that are often associated with quality of life were much less frequent; in 
fact, words such as wellbeing, wellness, content (as an adjective), happiness, thrive and thriving 
were nowhere to be found. Happy occurred just once, and was used in a quotation from a focus 
group of young men in Yemen about their hopes for the future: “the boys hoped to ‘get married, 
make my wife happy, and find a good job’” (p. 2, Box O.1).  
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Refer to the chart in Figure 3 for a basic list of terms in descending order of occurrence19 
that I have assigned to two different categories: those that convey (A) impersonal, technical, 
taxonomic, economic and/or quantitative ideas compared to (B) those that would be associated 
with personal, emotional and/or qualitative ideas, and (-) other terms that are more contested 
within development critique are left to the reader’s judgment. From observing the list, it is clear 
that designation (B) occurs with much less frequency than (A). The sheer magnitude of terms 
related to the labor market and sectors clarified that the objective of the report was primarily to 
recommend income-based approaches to tackling gender equality. 
Keywords Number of Occurrences 
Labor Force (A) 173 
Right/Rights (-) 87 
Public Sector (A) 87 
Private Sector (A) 81 
Gap (A) 66 
Lack (A) 50 
Difference (A) 30 
Statistics (A) 29 
Agency (B) 22 
Mobility (B) 21 
                                                 
19 To avoid repetition, I did not include instances of these terms in the table of contents or in any of the references. 
However, I did include instances in endnotes, tables and charts. 
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Traditional (A)  16 
Flexible, Flexibility20 (B) 12 
Behind, lag, lagged, or lagging (A) 8 
Empower, empowering (-) 7 
Fulfill, fulfilling (B) 6 
Voice (B) 6 
Aspire, aspired, aspiring (B) 6 
Modern (A) 5 
Shortage (A) 5 
Mismatch (A) 5 
Self-esteem, (self) confidence (B) 2 
Dreams (B) 1 
Satisfy (B) 1 
Basic Needs (B) 1 
Happy (B) 1 
Work quality (B) 1 
Capabilities (B) 1 
Figure 3: Language Usage in World Bank’s MENA Opening Doors Report 
                                                 
20 Does not include usage in “flexibility of the labor market”. 
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As can be seen throughout the report, the Bank’s priorities aligned with the neoliberal 
(Washington Consensus) values, as outlined in Chapter 1. The authors made great effort to 
emphasize the cultural shortcomings in MENA countries, as well as the economic inefficiencies 
of a large public sector, which it argued was based on a “social contract”21 that was “no longer 
sustainable in its implications for fiscal health and sustainable growth” (p. 121). The overall 
message served to subtly reinforce a homogenous image of Arab backwardness and 
authoritarianism, as if conservative ideals are universal or modern MENA governments do not 
have any genuine support and must bribe their citizens with jobs, subsidies and welfare benefits 
to gain legitimacy.  
By making blanket assertions about the region without critical analysis of the past and 
present contexts of specific countries or social groups, this myopic band of technical experts – 
much like their colonial predecessors – engaged in a process of homogenization “such as to wipe 
out any traces of individual Arabs with narratable life histories” (Said, 1978, p. 229). The report 
also aligns with the “Women in Development” approach, which integrates women into allegedly 
progressive development iniatives and accepts western modernization as inevitable and 
desirable, while largely ignoring gender relations beyond facile assertions that conservative 
norms are constricting (Peet and Hartwick, 2015). Given the report’s economistic biases, 
alternative perspectives that provide a wider frame of reference for women’s lives and 
livelihoods in MENA are warranted. 
 
                                                 
21 The Bank cites only its own publications to define its use of the term “social contract” as a situation in which 
institutions and members of a society are bound to and influence one another. It states that these actors “define the 
boundaries of acceptable policy choice, and they affect the organization of interests in society, helping to determine 
who wins and who loses in a given political economy” (p. 27). 
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Other Studies 
If we buy into the Bank’s narrative and insist upon addressing the gender gap in 
employment as the key to dismantling gender inequality, it ought to be noted that other 
explanations for low labor force participation of women and youth in the MENA indicate that the 
causes may be more complex than the Bank reported. For example, looking at political-economic 
reasons for women’s low or invisible positions in MENA economies, Valentine Moghadam 
(1995) provided an analysis of the post-colonial period of state-building economic development 
and industrialization, drawing from studies that explore the relationship between national 
resources and labor participation, as well as the overarching trends in political economy of the 
region. She stated that industrial expansion was slow in MENA until around the mid-20th 
century, when oil revenues were diverted by nascent revolutionary Arab regimes for import 
substitution industrialization. The dominant oil industry’s reliance on heavy machinery was 
subsequently deemed unsuitable for women’s employment. 
Additionally, the reliance on oil revenues made other industries insignificant in much of 
the region. In the oil-poor countries, governments favored large-scale agriculture and other 
export-oriented industries. Despite reliance on manufacturing in the non-oil economy of Jordan, 
for example, Moghadam cited the possibility that de facto state policies discouraged female 
employment to the advantage of men due to widespread unemployment, conditions of external 
debt and dependence on foreign aid. She didn’t refute cultural factors as having a role, but rather 
stated that the political-economical determinants of class divisions, international aid and uneven 
industrial development must also be considered when analyzing Arab women’s limited presence 
in the formal economy. 
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In an analysis of a 1982-83 manpower survey in Jordan, Hussein Shakhatreh (1995) 
concluded that many factors were contributing to low labor force participation of women in the 
country. He also stated that Jordanian women’s high educational attainment rates and low labor 
rates suggested they have been excluded from development. In his study, the important factors 
that pointed to better chances for economic participation (other than education) were: urban 
residence, single or divorced/widowed status, absence of young children in household, and the 
availability of cheap or free childcare. These factors implied that barriers to women joining the 
workforce are not as simple as cultural values or unsustainable allocation of government 
resources to the public sector, as the Opening Doors report suggested, but rather point to 
practical barriers caused by structural deficiencies, geographic distance from opportunities, and a 
lack of political willingness to support women’s employment.  
The Opening Doors report did address how household responsibilities are often a 
hindrance to women joining the formal workforce and that there is a significant gender gap in 
household chores and childcare responsibilities, illustrating with statistics from Iraq and 
Morocco that married women spend significantly more time than unmarried women or men 
performing these crucial reproductive activities. However, it did not address how something as 
practical as government-subsidized childcare, as Shakhatreh suggested, could improve women’s 
employment opportunities, as this would be contradictory to the Bank’s pro-market narrative. 
Moghadam and Shakhatreh, acting as policy advocates, provided tangible explanations for Arab 
women’s low employment rates, but it should be noted that they were still contributing to a 
framework that assumes economic activity in a state’s formal sector is necessary for gender 
equality in Arab society.  
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It is also important to contextualize the research put forth by the Bank: in the 
Acknowledgements section of the Opening Doors report, the team that contributed to its 
publication was listed by name and title, and it could be observed that all but one person in the 
core team and group of consultants were economists. In a compilation entitled Adventures in 
Aidland, David Mosse (2011) and other anthropologists provided a valuable critique of the 
structures of international development. In particular, in his ethnography of the World Bank, 
Mosse discovered that anthropologists working within the organization had to make sacrifices in 
order to build support among networks, which had a tendency to make their qualitative 
scholarship more economistic when they adopted and promoted buzzwords like social capital, 
for example. Similarly, geographer Anthony Bebbington (et al., 2004), a former Bank consultant, 
likewise implored us to consider the bureaucratic limitations and internal alliances that promote 
or block ideas presented in the Bank’s research, as well as the different languages and divergent 
preferences between the operational and policy/research staff. He advised that the internal 
tensions and outside pressures ensure that political and power-structure debates will be tempered 
by the institution before publication, as critiques of governments can cause complications for 
Bank staff working in those regions. Nevertheless, Bebbington assured us that qualitative, 
contextual language and ideas are not missing altogether from the institution’s lexicon and inner 
dialogues.  
 
Conclusion 
Much like Abu-Lughod’s conclusion that the AHDR 2005 report was simply reiterating 
western assumptions of modernity and neoliberalism, the Opening Doors report was a similarly 
normative device that also demonstrated the Bank’s attempt at being apolitical and technocratic 
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through its arguments and language choices, necessarily avoiding mention of its role in creating 
the conditions that constrain women in these countries. More political analyses are thus 
necessary, as was evidenced by Abu-Lughod, Moghadam and Shakhatreh. However, as 
Bebbington and others (2004) pointed out, the more political and socioculturally-aware research 
being conducted under the auspices of the Bank has to contend with a complex interior 
bureaucracy and an organizational preference of economic theories that are deeply entrenched 
and underscore its mission statement. When critiquing the Bank’s neoliberal bent, we must also 
recognize that there has been some progress, however slow, in developing its agenda to include 
more comprehensive concepts such as HDI and the recognition that women in MENA deserve 
more political voice. In the next chapter, I will delve further into sociological, anthropological 
and political science research of women in MENA to argue that state-level data and development 
assessments are inappropriate, given the significance of the informal economy, charitable and 
social networks in the region, and other challenges to implementing economic development 
initiatives.  
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Chapter 4 
Alternative Work and Coping Mechanisms of Women in MENA 
  
Introduction 
In the last half-century, dominant development thinking has shifted beyond mere 
modernization approaches – in which national income growth is seen as the correct path for 
allegedly backward or traditional countries (McDowell and Sharp, 1999) – to the more inclusive 
Human Development Index (HDI) that captures qualitative aspects such as life expectancy and 
education levels. In spite of this, there is still a desire within development agencies to measure 
and compare human achievement by country. Notably, the taxonomic differentiation of states 
based on developed and underdeveloped/developing is still pervasive in political and economic 
doctrine, yet it is difficult to understand how these designations are relevant to people when there 
is inequality at every scale. For example, we find poorer individuals living in developed nations 
who are deprived of opportunities and services, and citizens in developing countries who enjoy 
extraordinary wealth and privilege. When we notice this injustice, it becomes hard to ignore and 
deserves a closer look to determine how some of these taxonomies came to be. 
In this chapter, I will explore the origins of state-level economic data to argue that the 
discipline of economics and its methodologies are biased against women and that mainstream 
development policies to increase their formal labor force participation based on these data are 
inappropriate in both rural and urban contexts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region. Due to the harm caused by neoliberal ideology that I will explore here, I argue that more 
diverse, qualitative research is needed for effective development intervention. In particular, I 
assert that the presence of informal sector work and social networks in MENA, as coping 
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mechanisms, reflects the failure of western economic models. Using research performed 
independently of the major development institutions, I will show that the pro-market, pro-private 
sector values in mainstream development are at odds with the complex social, political and 
economic environments that constrain and define the lives of women living in the MENA region 
today. 
  
The Problems with National Data 
Reflecting on conceptions of modernity, Timothy Mitchell (2000) asserted that national 
income accounting is only an invention of the last century, yet governments’ fetishistic devotion 
to these statistics would make them seem timeless. This type of record-keeping, he argued, is a 
way of representing humans symbolically and numerically, making it possible to compare and 
categorize nations while simultaneously portraying the objects being represented as if they were 
fixed in space and time. It must be remembered, however, that these seductive representations 
ultimately reflect us: the collective output of our energies and the labors of daily life. The 
purpose of these measurements, however, was not to assess the benefits of labor for the laborers’ 
sake. 
In the 1970s and 80s, New Zealand politician and feminist economist Marilyn Waring 
(1988) began to question the validity of macroeconomic statistics, stating that these 
measurements are the “beguiling propaganda” (p. 45) of a professional system that is inherently 
biased towards its creators: educated men from the West. Based on the masculine and European 
origins of economics as a scientific discipline, she lamented that the definition of a state labor 
force includes only “the employed and unemployed” and “not the underemployed, the 
marginally employed, the would-be employed, and certainly not those who work in the informal 
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sector or who work as housewives” (p. 27). As such, economically intangible activities that are 
usually associated with women have no value and are not considered productive within this 
system. The rigid focus on numbers and the seemingly unbiased nature of empiricism and the 
scientific method, she argued, has “colonized” not just the cultures and value systems of 
developing world, but all women and children as well due to the perceived fruitlessness of their 
contributions (1988, p. 40). 
At the heart of modern economics, and by extension development practice, is the UN 
System of National Accounts (UNSNA), which Waring asserted is among “the most vicious 
tools of colonization” (p. 49). She revealed that this system, which has since been naturalized by 
most state governments trying to get a handle on the economic activity that takes place within 
their boundaries, was ultimately the product of 1930s-40s economic research in Britain 
(culminating in a 1953 report) to assess how the country would pay for war. From its design, 
Waring discovered that this system prioritized spending and accounting on behalf of Britain’s 
role in World War II, while it subordinated the wellbeing of its people. Despite recognition 
among some economists that national income growth could not illustrate internal conditions of 
poverty or inequality, she declared that this system became “even more entrenched in the 
intervening decades” (p. 58). 
Waring argued that these statistics, as they are based largely upon censuses, ought to be 
revamped to capture women’s labor and time. Her critique is significant to gender analyses of 
development, as the UNSNA has been used in a mostly uncritical fashion to identify, design and 
evaluate economic interventions. In view of the fact that MENA countries often lack in capacity 
for measuring these data (Anker and Anker, 1995; World Bank, 2013), and because Arab women 
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are economically and socially less visible than men, this can lead to locally inappropriate or 
incomplete policy. 
Time, however, is a fixed factor of all economic activity that does not discriminate by 
gender: Waring argued that the data used to build these statistics ought to at least include time 
budgets, since a complete overhaul of national accounting is unlikely. These budgets would 
provide a much more accurate depiction of women’s work because they are organized around the 
constant measurement of time, and eliminate some of the points of exclusion (such as economic 
terms) in traditional surveys that are framed around productive employment. She also argued 
they would not be additionally burdensome given the complexity of existing household budget 
surveys she had analyzed (Waring, 1988; Nash and Martin, 1995). 
Several studies specific to the MENA region have uncovered the inadequacy of survey 
techniques and provided suggestions in line with Waring’s, concluding that the data on Arab 
women and their economic activity are indeed inaccurate. In the early 1990s, economist Richard 
Anker and statistician Martha Anker analyzed interview methods from a rural Egyptian census to 
determine why female labor force participation was chronically low, when earlier research in the 
1980s had shown it to be higher. After observing trends that linked answers to respondents’ lack 
of understanding of the economic terms used in the survey, Anker and Anker suggested that with 
proper definition of “labor force” and “work”, much ambiguity could be eliminated. They also 
suggested that with specific daily activities listed in questionnaires for respondents to choose 
from and more probing interview methods, more accurate data could be collected – i.e., 
secondary activities that the interviewees may not consider “work” but which contribute to a 
family farm or business. 
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More recently in Egypt, sociologists Ray Langsten and Rania Salem (2008) analyzed two 
different types of surveys used on the same women to determine their actual productivity, as 
opposed to strictly labor force participation. They concluded that activity logs, instead of 
keyword questionnaires, uncovered many hidden tasks that could be considered work, but which 
are not recognized as such on a national or international level. Their findings harmonized with 
that of Anker and Anker (1995), and both studies provided concrete evidence of the gendered 
division of labor, the underestimation of women’s work in censuses, as well as differences in 
understanding economic concepts among women of different backgrounds and education levels 
due to the bias of such terminology towards what is traditionally men’s work: stable, productive, 
remunerated and market-oriented employment (Benería, 1981; Waring, 1988). However, if one 
were looking for highest accuracy, advanced survey methods such as the activity logs mentioned 
earlier would not necessarily accomplish this, as tasks often overlap, are overlooked, or may be 
split between individuals (MacDonald, 1995). 
These shortfalls in data collection, which Waring demonstrated are not limited to the 
developing world when she analyzed New Zealand and Canada, imply that state reporting 
mechanisms may not be meeting the UNSNA international reporting standards, providing 
deflated accounts of women’s work. Feminist economist Lourdes Benería (1981), like Waring, 
also stated that this obsession with market-based economics obscures the actual labor of women 
in developing countries, and is representative of sexist attitudes that value remunerated work 
over women’s work, which is often unremunerated. In rural areas where women spend much of 
their time laboring and multitasking between productive and reproductive activities that do not 
earn them a place within the labor force, disaggregating these tasks would be difficult. This 
challenge suggests that the undervaluation of women’s work may not be completely attributable 
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to its lower status, but that capturing these data is logistically cumbersome in a system that was 
designed to measure mostly men’s work (Benería, 1981 and 1997; Waring, 1988). 
Given that domestic labor is overwhelmingly women’s work across the globe, Benería 
and Waring also argued that collecting good data on women’s production is crucial to prevent 
their double-burden of labor. Benería even called for development policies, regardless of scale, 
to consider women’s double-work, suggesting that planning has fallen short of benefiting half of 
the world’s population because of ideological barriers and functional inconveniences. Population 
expert Huda Zurayk (1985) also echoed Benería’s call for governments to more accurately 
capture “the type and extent of the existing economic contribution of all members of society” (p. 
45). She claimed that without this, they couldn’t claim to meet their development goals. 
Because mainstream development policies often advocate for technical solutions (Li, 
2005) such as women’s formal inclusion in the workforce, they may be inappropriate when so 
much economic production in the developing world takes place outside of the formal market 
(but, ironically, often takes place in an actual market). This is certainly the case in MENA: its 
history of state-led development and subsequent rapid market liberalization has created the 
perfect conditions for Arab women and men to sidestep formal employment and state welfare 
institutions just to survive. Given the invisibility of this process, a smaller-scale glance at social 
conditions and microeconomic motivations is warranted to understand the concepts that macro-
level statistics cannot explain. 
  
Ideological Biases and Informal Economies 
Returning to the basic aims of economic development, the allegedly universal goal of 
personal freedoms and wealth accumulation may not align with values held by women outside of 
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the West. Abu-Lughod (2013) cited examples of women in rural Egypt who did not ascribe to 
western feminist ideals of individuality and self-reliance, factors that are integral to women 
joining the formal workforce. From her ethnographic research, she demonstrated that it is 
inaccurate to assume all Arab women desire the life of a western woman. In fact, some women in 
these remote rural villages weren’t aware of women’s rights discourses that had emerged among 
Egyptian feminist groups, insinuating there is an urban bias to these ideals within this Arab 
nation. Other anthropological research provides insight into the ways in which women decide (or 
are forced) to support themselves and their families. 
In her ethnography of working class urban households in Cairo, Homa Hoodfar (1997) 
discovered women had many different coping mechanisms in response to Egypt’s late-20th 
century period of market liberalization and economic privatization under president Anwar Sadat 
(Infitah, or Open Door Policy), structural adjustment programs and the mass emigration of men 
to the oil producing countries in the Arabian Peninsula. She noted that rapid growth and rural-
urban migration had shifted the cultural landscape of the city, resulting in many women living far 
from their families or other close social networks. At the same time, the private sector and state 
had not provided any significant solution to alleviate these “special circumstances” (p. 126). 
Under these conditions, Hoodfar witnessed the diversification and multitasking of 
women’s income-earning activities in the urban settings, much like what Benería discussed 
regarding rural areas. Many women she encountered did work in formal employment, preferring 
the flexibility, stability and respectable nature of government jobs such as teaching and 
administration. However, wages stagnated and the Egyptian public sector continued to contract 
during the period of Hoodfar’s study due to the Infitah policies and the erosion of state services 
due to structural adjustment programs implemented while the country sought debt relief. 
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Given these conditions, it became increasingly practical and necessary for these women 
to engage in informal income-earning activities. In her target communities, Hoodfar noted that 
local markets had a high female presence, and that trading in food and textiles was a common 
option that allowed them to remain close to home, whereas factory employment would 
necessitate spending money and time arranging for childcare and transportation in the rapidly 
developing and congested city. Thus, the “petty production” (p. 129) that Hoodfar encountered in 
working-class neighborhoods of Cairo was a pragmatic alternative to external employment. 
Working for a husband’s business was also considered suitable for women in these lower 
income areas, although many women did not consider themselves to be “working” when they 
contributed in that capacity. In many cases, their informally earned income was not discussed 
with husbands, due to a common perception among these women that men had “sticky fingers” 
for their wives’ meager earnings (p. 129). Because of this, some women relied on one another to 
help out with their small businesses instead of involving the husbands, despite the women’s 
reportedly obligatory contribution to their husbands’ businesses. 
The expansion of these Cairene women’s trust and cooperation outside of the nuclear 
family suggests that stereotypes of the cloistered Arab woman, as well as generalizations about 
household cohesion that are common in economic theories, ought to be reconsidered. 
Additionally, welfare of the family unit is not necessarily the primary determinant of women’s 
economic decisions and survival strategies (Wolf, 1997). Hoodfar’s study was crucial to 
understanding the complexity and variety of individual interests, bargains and strategies in 
women’s lives based on qualitative research at the household and neighborhood level. It also 
demonstrated that formal employment might be impractical for many women in developing 
countries, suggesting that this common development goal might never be attainable until these 
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barriers, including the gendered division of labor that exists to varying degrees in every country, 
are tackled. 
A more methodical approach to researching Arab women’s informal employment arrived 
in the first decade of the 21st century, where entrepreneurial experts Haya Al-Dajani and Susan 
Marlow (2013) explored the empowerment potential of handicraft, “heritage-based” (p. 518) 
microenterprise among displaced Palestinian women in Jordan, minus the fetishizing that often 
accompanies such advocacy. To assess the factors of empowerment that are harder to judge than 
simply economic profits, Al-Dajani compiled “potentially measurable” (p. 514) indicators of 
female empowerment into a collective framework that highlighted seven outcomes that are 
crucial for undertaking entrepreneurial activity. These were: “increased awareness and 
knowledge, accountability and responsibility, making decisions and having choices, leadership, 
self-identity, reduced poverty and economic establishment” (p. 514). 
The positive outcomes of their longitudinal study (1999 to 2009) suggested that it is 
possible to preserve indigenous knowledge and talent while improving the status and 
circumstances of marginalized women such as migrants and refugees, as the participants 
expressed the benefits of this entrepreneurship throughout the study in a way that was personal, 
experiential, and meaningful to them. In some cases, the women reported they had earned the 
respect of their husbands who acknowledged the family circumstances would be much worse off 
without the income from their wives’ embroidery work. Thus, such research suggests that 
livelihood options in the home-based informal sector may be practical and culturally appropriate 
alternatives to formal sector jobs for Arab women, the benefits of which are measurable in a 
qualitative way that is more relatable and personal than sterile statistics reflecting 
macroeconomic growth. 
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Al-Dajani and Marlow, however, were careful to note that these enterprise activities had 
a limited ability to disrupt or overcome the existing patriarchal structures, or the state structures 
and attitudes that disadvantaged these women who were in an additionally subordinated position 
as displaced people within a host society. Despite its potential to increase women’s agency 
within the household and community, informal work performed by either gender lacks the 
protection benefits and income security of (some, but not all) formal jobs, and for women, lacks 
the capacity to challenge the gender hierarchy that relegated them to the market’s margins in the 
first place (Kabeer et al., 2013). At these smaller scales in the MENA region, however, we also 
witness alternative institutions and networks that have been created to protect against the 
uncertainty of informal work and alleviate difficult economic circumstances. 
  
Savings Groups, Reciprocity and Social Networks 
Some of the key outcomes of several Arab states’ debt relief in the latter half of the 20th 
century were the structural adjustment policies enforced by international financial institutions: 
namely, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Requiring massive restructuring of 
economies that had been shaped through state-led development, the observable effects within the 
household were decreased wages, rising prices of goods and services, and the removal or 
downgrading of the government’s provision of social welfare, including healthcare, education 
and food subsidies (Hoodfar, 1997; Clark, 2004). Because these responsibilities are often 
provided or organized within households by the women in any society, the disintegration of such 
safety nets has affected them disproportionately, eventually necessitating other arrangements that 
stand in for welfare or banking structures to meet basic needs. 
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A particularly visible impact of poverty, which was created or exacerbated in some 
MENA households by the aforementioned restructuring, is a lack of income and thus less cash to 
spend on basic needs. Additionally, one of the persistent gaps in the developing world that 
signals gender inequality, and sometimes statutory discrimination, is many women’s inability to 
access credit and formal loans (Kabeer, 2016) to start businesses, buy necessary household items 
or invest in their children’s education. Based on these deficiencies and the lack of formal options 
to improve these circumstances, other avenues have become increasingly important in Arab 
societies. 
In Hoodfar’s Cairo study, she witnessed the potential of the gamʻiyat, or savings clubs, to 
meet women’s household spending needs, acting as “an effective parallel banking system” (p. 
218). The primary force driving these informal networks is that of reciprocity and the 
expectation of future interaction with those who provided the support. Structured solely on social 
relationships and cohesion among members of a homogenous ethnic and socioeconomic group of 
women, the pressure and personal or familial reputation tied to meeting debt obligations within 
these circles were noted by Hoodfar as effective means of achieving cooperation. She also noted, 
however, that the changing demographic makeup of Cairene neighborhoods was weakening 
these groups, indicating that a relatively homogenous cultural or class identity is a key 
contributor to the success of such reciprocal transactions, thus suggesting that savings groups 
that transcend these identity boundaries may not be as effective. 
Other economic coping mechanisms that act as alternatives to state welfare in the Arab 
world are the multitude of indigenous non-governmental organizations that claim to operate 
based on Islamic values, which political scientist, Janine A. Clark (2004), termed Islamic social 
institutions, or ISIs. In a comprehensive study of ISIs in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, Clark 
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determined that many of these organizations did in fact provide necessary services at cheaper (or 
free) costs to the poor, as well as contributed to building solidarity and identity among the 
women and men who were volunteers or employees of these organizations. Among the 
institutions she explored were Islamic medical clinics in Cairo, a large umbrella organization in 
Jordan that coordinates education, social and health services for its citizens, and a Yemeni 
women’s network associated with Islah, a popular Islamic political alliance. 
Analyzing the composition and leadership of these ISIs, as well as the benefits and 
attitudes towards them, Clark refuted prior research on social movements in the region that 
assumed such institutions mobilize the lower classes into participating in Islamist causes. 
Instead, she asserted that the mostly educated, urban and middle-class membership of these 
networks frequently excluded the poor due to social links that were strong within classes and 
weak across them, and that many of the services provided were disproportionately beneficial to 
the middle class communities. For example, in Egypt and Jordan, cost-prohibitive medical 
services were largely located in wealthier neighborhoods that were inaccessible to the poor. 
The ISIs studied by Clark were founded according to and operating under Islamic 
principles of charity and a united Muslim community, although the commercialization of some 
were highly controversial, such as how the Islamic Hospital in Jordan that provides services too 
costly for the poor is often referred to as “Commercial Hospital” or “Criminal Hospital” (p. 113). 
Despite the potential for ISIs to improve solidarity among their educated middle class 
constituencies and their necessary role – however nominal – in filling the gaps where economic 
restructuring in much of the MENA region had hindered state welfare provision, Clark argued 
that they were not an appropriate substitute for the state itself. This would support an argument 
for basic needs provision and strengthening Arab governmental institutions as a part of 
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comprehensive development programs instead of relying on neoliberal assumptions of free 
market efficiency or placing a disproportionate burden on the local civil society and non-
governmental organizations to provide for those in need. The existence of these ISIs as charitable 
institutions, as well as their privileges that exclude many they claim to benefit, demonstrate 
clearly that the poor, and especially poor women to whom welfare services are crucial, are 
perpetually left behind. 
  
Conclusion 
From its inception, the bulk gathering of economic data for national and international 
purposes has been biased against women or any laborer who does not generate an income or 
interact directly with the formal “market”. In part, this is due to the epistemological supremacy 
of economics as a scientific discipline and its masculine (and masculinist) origins, where women 
and other non-producers have been left out of the equation. As Waring, Benería and others 
demonstrated through a feminist economist lens, the undervaluation of women’s work in national 
and global measurements is the byproduct of a sexism that is international, not confined to 
MENA, and demonstrates the difficulty of capturing the nuances of labor that is not directly 
profitable or widely recognized as “work”. Practical solutions would be to expand upon 
traditional notions of work through the use of activity-based time logs or more detailed 
questionnaires during census taking; however, these measures are still subject to 
misunderstanding and bias. 
The danger lies in the preeminence of conventional measurements: development and 
economic policymakers justify their interventions based on these data, despite the fact that 
women’s labor isn’t represented because they are preoccupied with ensuring basic survival and 
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reproduction of their households under increasingly deprived conditions. As demonstrated by 
qualitative studies in rural and urban Arab societies, the importance of coping strategies like 
informal sector work and social networks should not be ignored in development policy in a 
region like MENA, where the prevalence of these strategies signals the failure of applying 
western economic (neoliberal/conventional) policy prescriptions. In addition, practical 
hindrances to formal employment for many women may belie the assumption that their low 
economic participation rate is mostly a cultural or religious phenomenon. However, women’s 
unequal exposure to these barriers due to assumptions of domestic responsibilities does suggest 
gender discrimination, though it is important to note that this is not limited to MENA or even the 
developing world. 
The social networks, survival tactics and entrepreneurial activities explored above might 
indeed offer relief for Arab women in dire circumstances. Unfortunately, there is limited 
potential for these options to help them transform patriarchal gender roles, both within the 
household and in the communities where their status is also constrained by myriad intersectional 
identities – such as religion, class, education, location, citizenship, marital status and age – that 
can only be discerned through painstaking sociological study. Thus, it is incomplete and 
inappropriate to design development interventions for women based largely on macroeconomic 
indicators (that were never meant to benefit or represent them in the first place) and western 
assumptions of progress without considering the particular circumstances, politics or the 
diversity of values and personal interests that shape their daily lives. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
  
Whenever we view other cultures and the differences therein, it is perhaps natural to 
blame any observed faults on characteristics that do not resonate with our own experiences. 
Religion is often an easy target because it is so integral to the spoken and unspoken rules 
governing daily life for such a large portion of humanity. However, our collective western 
amnesia and unwillingness to see other factors like the long-term negative consequences of 
historic events that people similar to us perpetrated generations ago (with weak justification) are 
difficult things to accept. 
When all you know is a culture built upon principles of rugged individualism, it is hard to 
imagine a life where the welfare and reputation of your family supersede your own interests and 
dreams. When you are accustomed to sexual freedom and a relatively liberal dress code that 
evolved from decades of social struggle, it is difficult to picture being part of a society where 
those aspects may not be desired by all. I am not stating that a rural Arab/Muslim woman will 
always reject western influences in favor of her own belief system and familiar practices; rather, 
I assert that her choice should be as authentic as possible to her personal and cultural preferences 
and values and that we as outsiders must heed and respect the complexities that constrain 
decisionmaking in any location or social context. 
The problems magnify when we make choices on behalf of others. With colonialism, the 
choices made by European officials resulted in the erosion of indigenous people’s choices and 
opportunities. Transforming their educational systems, creating specific depictions of women in 
Arab society and obscuring the injustices of imperialism through the takeover of Middle Eastern 
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historiography were prime examples of this. When the European colonial presence exacerbated 
the public-private separation between genders, the decision-making capabilities for women 
became even more limited, which fixed the image of the Arab woman in the western mind as 
helpless and in need of salvation. As discursive prejudices against Arabs based on these ideas 
made their way over time into political and economic conversations, they became perhaps less 
overt, but no less harmful. 
Despite the aim in modern development to overcome objectively negative conditions like 
poverty and inequality, the whole package (ideas and praxis) has been definitively one-sided. As 
in the period of European colonialism, these processes are also motivated by misunderstandings 
and unease about cultural identities out of step with an imagined global mainstream. It is also 
important to recognize that none of this is accidental: the reason western values became 
dominant in the first place was by muting other identities through manifest and abstract 
processes. This, however, remains an uncomfortable and controversial topic when the focus is 
firmly fixed upon feel-good concepts like empowerment, prosperity, equality and rights. 
In this thesis, I presented the different representations of western imperialism in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and how they have changed shape over time. In 
Chapter 2, I reviewed the colonial era’s impacts on knowledge creation/dissemination and Arab 
gender relations. I also looked at the persistence of colonial (reductionist) attitudes towards Arab 
women in modern development discourse, as presented in Abu-Lughod’s scholarship, among 
others. In Chapter 3, I performed my own empirical investigation of a recent World Bank report 
based on Abu-Lughod’s model, demonstrating that the focus on culture and religion is indeed a 
common theme; as is the tendency to ignore any western role in creating the conditions the 
development institutions hope to correct. My discourse analysis also demonstrated the extreme 
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economistic bias in mainstream development. Lastly, in Chapter 4, I employed a feminist 
analysis to argue that economics, as the main academic/scientific discipline that influences 
development discourse and policy, is inherently biased against women and is therefore 
inappropriate for intervention without including more nuanced, qualitative research. When we 
look at some of these studies, however, it becomes clear that western economic policies have not 
served MENA well. 
The potential solutions for poverty and gender inequality are as multifaceted as the 
causes, yet the preferred method of tackling these issues is based upon a narrow worldview 
informed largely by a rehashed, nearsighted economic theory. The language presented in 
documents such as the Arab Human Development Report of 2005 and the Opening Doors report 
hides behind a veil of technical objectivity. By asserting the causes of Arab women’s low rank in 
both economy and society as rooted in imprudent state expenditures and traditional cultural 
values, the authors, as technical experts in only one subset of the social sciences, have reinvented 
and reinforced the ahistorical and apolitical stance of their imperial forefathers. 
Because it originated from the scientific postulates of conventional economics, 
development at its core has addressed the needs of the state economy first, with the assumption 
that the benefits of national wealth will positively affect everyone in a society. However, certain 
bumps in the road have made the daily reality much less sunny: in developing countries, 
economic restructuring at the behest of the IMF and World Bank has created basic human needs 
deprivations with debtor nations on multiple continents struggling to implement market 
liberalization measures and repay their compounding loans (Kabeer et al., 2016). Despite proof 
of the social disadvantages to neoliberalism, free market values are still being pushed quite 
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unapologetically by the orthodox international financial institutions, as was demonstrated in the 
recent Opening Doors report. 
With neoliberalism comes the power of “the market”. Compared to tangible experiences 
in day-to-day life, such as the transactions between small numbers of geographically proximate 
people in a physical market, the “market” – as it is imagined at both the national and global level 
– is quite the abstraction indeed. If it is so foreign and irrelevant to our immediate experiences, 
why does it hold so much sway over our governments? Is it simply another way for those who 
hold power to remain detached and deflect blame for actions and systems they meddle in that 
cause harm? Is it really an appropriate tool for determining the allocation of resources that either 
enable or obstruct the pursuit of happiness and fulfillment? 
Although it is not my intent to indiscriminately condemn capitalism, the discipline of 
economics or the development industry as a whole, I do mean to pose the above questions in a 
serious way in relation to the MENA region and its inhabitants, as I am not convinced that the 
market is the best solution. Nor am I convinced that recommendations leading to market 
interventions are appropriate for women without helping meet their basic needs, or without 
considerable structural changes that reorganize gender roles to alleviate some of their traditional 
burdens. Not once did the Opening Doors report suggest men in the Arab world could help 
women in childcare or household duties, yet as we could see in the Cairo ethnography and in 
other studies, such constraints contribute to the infamously low labor force rate among women in 
the Arab world. However, these factors are rarely considered in economists’ accounts because 
they do not have direct ties to the market. 
There is also a prevailing belief in the development industry that economic empowerment 
is a prerequisite for gender equality. Although equality certainly requires equal opportunity, 
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many individuals throughout the world can probably recall a moment when they were miserable 
in a certain career and did not feel particularly empowered. Abu-Lughod (2009) likewise 
reminded us that “employment is not by its nature liberating” (p. 89), a sentiment that was 
iterated extensively, much to my surprise, in the Human Development Report of 2015 (UNDP). 
There is perhaps some evidence that the script is changing, after all. 
Work is not simply income: it does not require an exchange of money, an office, or a 
factory to be a fruitful way to spend one’s time or seek meaning in life. Although money is a 
necessary tool of survival at present, it does not mean we should depreciate the value of 
unremunerated work that is reproducing households and societies, because this labor is truly 
crucial for sustaining humanity (Waring, 1988). When viewed from this perspective, “women’s 
work” becomes much more impressive than many economists would have you think; it could 
even be a respectable position for which both genders compete in the future. To gain these 
alternative viewpoints, the narratives and experiences of women all over the world are crucial for 
trying to grasp the complex interactions between gender, identity, economy, politics and society; 
the MENA region is no exception. 
In the conclusion of Do Muslim Women Need Saving, Abu-Lughod (2013) advised that 
we “take time to listen” before jumping into action on behalf of these women (p. 202). However, 
it is not difficult to see why this approach would be unfavorable to policymakers: qualitative 
research doesn’t make a solid case for intervention in this world still dominated by quantitative 
methods that are incapable of expressing the variations among people living in the Arab world. 
Much of the reductionism of Arab women has been conflated with Islam and Arab racial heritage 
(Abu-Lughod, 2009); however, it should be noted that not all Arabs are Muslims, and not all 
Muslims are devout. In fact, not all Arabs are Arabs: a multitude of ethnicities and heritages 
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undergird modern societies in the MENA region, but mentioning Kurds or Nubians or Berbers in 
development documents, for example, would be counterproductive to the policy goals and 
politically controversial in the target countries. 
It is clear that the complexities of modern societies would become muddled in the limited 
scope of development policies, but there is potential for improvement. There is a need to bridge 
the gap between conceptual feminist and postcolonial theories and mainstream development 
discourse and activities, putting into action intellectuals’ calls for more radical change by 
clearing space on the podium for non-western voices (McEwan, 2008). Unfortunately, as Abu-
Lughod demonstrated with her critique of the AHDR 2005 report, even these more inclusive 
viewpoints may be coming from a position of privilege and western bias, suggesting that the 
epistemological legacies of colonialism may never fully disappear. 
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